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Abstract 
Market-based mechanisms such as auctions are 
being studied as an appropriate means for re­
source allocation in distributed and multiagent 
decision problems. When agents value resources 
in combination rather than in isolation, they must 
often deliberate about appropriate bidding strate­
gies for a sequence of auctions offering resources 
of interest. We briefly describe a discrete dy­
namic programming model for constructing ap­
propriate bidding policies for resources exhibit­
ing both complementarities and substitutability. 
We then introduce a continuous approximation 
of this model, assuming that money (or the nu­
meraire good) is infinitely divisible. Though 
this has the potential to reduce the computational 
cost of computing policies, value functions in the 
transformed problem do not have a convenient 
closed form representation. We develop grid­
based approximations for such value functions, 
representing value functions using piecewise lin­
ear approximations. We show that these methods 
can offer significant computational savings with 
relatively small cost in solution quality. 
1 Introduction 
A great deal of attention has been paid to the development 
of appropriate models and protocols for the interaction of 
agents in distributed and multiagent systems (MASs). Of­
ten agents need access to specific resources to pursue their 
objectives, but the needs of one agent may conflict with 
those of another. A number of market-based approaches 
have been proposed as a means to deal with resource alloca­
tion and related problems in MASs [6, 20, 22]. Of particu­
lar interest are auction mechanisms, where each agent bids 
for a resource according to some protocol, and the alloca­
tion and price for the resource are determined by specific 
rules [14]. Auctions have a number of desirable properties 
as a means for coordinating activities, including minimiz-
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ing the communication between agents and, in some cases, 
guaranteeing Pareto efficient outcomes [14, 22]. 
In order to effectively make use of market mechanisms, an 
agent must be aware of the resources it needs, their value, 
and how best to obtain them. In sequential decision making 
under uncertainty, an agent will typically consider a number 
of potential courses of action and settle on one with high­
est expected utility. However, when different courses of ac­
tion require different collections of resources to be imple­
mented, an agent must develop rational bidding strategies 
in order to obtain the most desirable resource sets. In many 
cases, these resources will be made available by different 
sellers at different times and at uncertain prices. As a con­
sequence, optimal bidding behavior in a sequence of auc­
tions is of considerable interest. Of course, similar consid­
erations apply to other forms of market interaction as well: 
what resources should be purchased, at what prices, at what 
time, what portion of the budget should be set aside for spe­
cific resources, and so on. 
In the setting described above, an agent often requires sev­
eral resources (a resource bundle) before pursuing a par­
ticular course of action. Obtaining one resource without 
another-for example, being allocated trucks without fuel 
or drivers, or processing time on a machine without skilled 
labor to operate it--makes that resource worthless. Such re­
sources are said to exhibit complementarities. Furthermore, 
resource bundles are generally substitutable: obtaining the 
bundle needed to pursue one course of action can lower the 
value of obtaining another, or render it worthless. For in­
stance, once trucks and drivers are obtained for transporting 
material in an optimal fashion, helicopters and pilots lose 
any value they may have had. 
Complementarities and substitutability complicate the pro­
cess of bidding on resources. A key difficulty that arises in 
the sequential model is how an agent computes bids for in­
dividual resources. An agent has a valuation for a particular 
resource bundle b = { r1, · · 
· , rk}, but has no independent 
assignment of value to the individual resources. While auc­
tion theory can tell us how an agent should bid as a function 
of its valuation of resource r; for specific auction mecha­
nisms [ 14], in our setting no such valuation exists. If b is 
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worth v(b), how is an agent to "distribute the value" among 
the resources r; in order to compute bids?1 
In earlier work [3], we described a sequential auction model 
and a dynamic programming algorithm for constructing op­
timal bidding policies when agents valued bundles that ex­
hibited the type of complementarity and substitutability that 
arises in sequential decision models. Specifically, assum­
ing resources are auctioned in a known order, we modeled 
the bidding problem as a Markov decision process (MOP), 
and described how an agent could construct an optimal bid­
ding policy for the sequence of auctions based on its val­
uations of different resource bundles. Agents can choose 
how much (and whether) to bid for a resource depending on 
past successes, failures, prices, and so on. Unfortunately, 
the number of bids available at any point in time is gener­
ally very large. Given any stated of the agent's endowment 
(say, measured in dollars), the agent can bid any amount 
less than d for the good in question. Since endowments can 
usually be divided quite finely, this induces very large state 
and action spaces, causing computational difficulty for dis­
crete dynamic programming. While the complexity of the 
algorithm grows only linearly in the size of the endowment, 
large endowments, or endowments that are finely divisible, 
often cause greater computational difficulty than the num­
ber of resources under consideration, inducing MOPs with 
very large state and action spaces. 
In this paper, we investigate continuous approximations of 
this model, allowing an agent's endowment and set of pos­
sible bids to vary continuously. While this clearly expands 
the state and action spaces, we do this in the hope of us­
ing continuous function maximization methods to choose 
optimal bids. Once again, difficulties arise because value 
functions in this model generally do not have a conve­
nient closed fonn representation. To deal with this, we in­
troduce grid-based approximation methods for computing 
value functions. In particular, we sample the value func­
tion at specific points in state space (at various endowment 
levels) and use linear interpolation to detennine the value 
function at other points in state space. This is similar in 
spirit to the use of grid-based methods for approximating 
value functions (w.r.t. belief space) in partially observable 
Markov decision processes [4, II, 13, 12]. We show that 
the piecewise linear (PWL) value functions constructed in 
this fashion approximate the true value functions for the se­
quential bidding problem quite closely in many instances, 
while requiring considerably less computational effort. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec­
tion 2 we describe the basic resource allocation problem un­
der consideration and review the MDP model of this prob­
lem and the DP algorithm for bidding policy construction of 
[3]. In Section 3 we describe a continuous approximation of 
the discrete MDP, where endowment is treated as a contin­
uous component of state space and the action space (pos-
1 �ompl�menta�ties are often a�dressed l!nder the guise of 
combmatonal and Simultaneous auctwns; we d1scuss these briefly 
in Section 6. 
sible bids) is similarly treated continuously. We describe 
a fixed-grid method for approximating the value functions 
in the continuous MDP that constructs piecewise linear ap­
proximations of the value functions, and whose error can 
be bounded a posteriori. In Section 4 we describe empir­
ical results using the fixed grid approximation. We show 
that computing value functions at a small number of sam­
ple points and interpolating can offer significant computa­
tional savings in constructing value functions and the in­
duced policies, yet often provides very good approxima­
tions to both the optimal value function and optimal policy. 
We also demonstrate that, as expected, increased grid den­
sity offers better solution quality at higher computational 
cost, allowing anytime tradeoffs to be addressed within our 
model. In Section 5, we briefly describe two variable grid 
methods for value function approximation that introduce 
grid points into the approximation in places estimated to 
provide highest reduction in approximation error. We con­
clude in Section 6 with a discussion of related work and sug­
gestions for future research. 
2 The Discrete DP Model 
2.1 Resource Allocation Problems 
We assume we have a finite collection of agents, all of 
whom require resources from a pool of n resources R = 
{r1, · · ·, rn}. We denote by Rt the subset {r1, · · ·, rt}, t :::; 
n, with R0 = 0 by convention. We describe the quantities 
relevant to a specific agent a, since our focus in the paper 
is on the computation of policies for a fixed agent. Agent a 
can use exactly one bundle b; = { rL · · ·, rtb'l} of resources 
from a set of k possible bundles: B = { b1, ... , bk}. We de­
note by U = UB the set of useful resources for our agent. 
Generally, a need only worry about the properties (e.g., ex­
pected prices and demand) of resources in this set. 2 For this 
reason, we take U to be identical to R (possibly by ignoring 
irrelevant resources in R). 
Agent a bas a positive valuation vW) for each resource 
bundle b' E B. This may, for instance, reflect the expected 
value of some course of action which requires the resource 
in b'. Suppose the holdings of a, h � R, are those resources 
it is able to obtain. The value of these holdings is given by 
v(h) = max{ vW) : b; � h }; that is, the agent will be 
able to use the resource bundle from among those it holds in 
entirety with maximal value, with the others going unused. 
This is consistent with our interpretation given in Section I 
where resource bundles correspond to alternative plans for 
achieving some objective.3 We denote by 1i the set of pos­
sible holdings (i.e., 1i = 2R). 
2This is not true when demand for elements of U is correlated 
with that for other resources. We do not address this possibility in 
this paper (see [3]). 
3 Our model can be extended to deal with bundles that stand in 
more general subadditiverelations than the complete substitutabil­
ity described here (though all such relations could be represented 
in the form described here with simple transformations). We keep 
this assumption for ease of presentation. 
-; 
The resources R of interest to a will be auctioned off se­
quentially in a fixed, known order: without loss of gener­
ality, we assume that this ordering is r1, r2, · · · ,  rn We use 
A; to denote the auction for r;. Agent a is given an initial 
endowment e of some common numeraire good (we'll use 
dollars) which it can use to obtain resources. At the end of 
the round, a has holdings h and d dollars remaining from its 
endowment.4 We assume that the utility of being in such a 
state at the end of the round is given by v (h) + f (d), where 
f is some function attaching utility to the unused portion 
of the endowment. Other utility functions could be consid­
ered, but this form is often suitable. 
There are a wide range of options one could consider when 
instantiating this framework, with regard to the type of auc­
tions used, the information provided to agents, and so on 
(see [3] for more on this). We assume that the individual 
auctions will be first-price, sealed-bid--each agent will pro­
vide a single bid and the highest bidder will be awarded the 
resource for the price bid. We adopt this model because 
of the ease with which it fits with our sequential model for 
bid computation; however, we believe our model could be 
adapted to other auction protocols as well as to other forms 
of market interaction. We also assume that bids are dis­
crete (integer-valued): that is, bids are not arbitrarily di­
visible. Additionally, we assume that agents, once obtain­
ing a resource, cannot resell that resource to another agent. 
This, of course, means that an agent may obtain one re­
source r;, but later be unable to obtain a complementary 
resource r;+k• essentially being "stuck" with a useless re­
source r;. We do this primarily for simplicity, though in cer­
tain settings this assumption may be realistic. We are cur­
rently exploring more sophisticated models where agents 
can "put back" resources for re-auctioning, or possibly re­
sell resources directly to other agents. Finally, we assume 
that agent a believes that the highest bid that will be made 
for resource r;, excluding any bid a might make, is drawn 
from some unknown distribution Pr;. Because bids are 
integer-valued, this unknown distribution is a multinomial 
over a non-negative, bounded range of integers.5 
We make two remarks on this model. First, if the space 
of possible bids is continuous, a suitable continuous PDF 
(e.g., Gaussian) could be used to model bid distributions 
(and uncertainty about the parameters of this PDF, if neces­
sary). Second, we make an implicit assumption that bids for 
different resources are uncorrelated. By having indepen­
dent distributions Pr; rather than a joint distribution over 
all bids, agent a is reasoning as if the bids for different re­
sources are independent. When resources exhibit comple­
mentarities, this is unlikely to be the case. For instance, if 
someone bids up the price of some resource r; (e.g., trucks), 
4 If speculation or reselling is allowed, there is the possibility 
that d > e, depending on the interaction protocols we allow. We 
ignore this possibility here. 
5 We assume that some reasonable bound can be placed on the 
highest bid. In [3] we represent a's uncertainty over the parame­
ters of this distribution with a Dirichlet distribution. The expected 
values of these parameters can be used here without difficulty. 
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they may subsequently bid up the price of complementary 
resource ri (e.g., fuel or drivers). If agent a does not ad­
mit a model that can capture such correlations, it may make 
poor bids for certain resources. Once again, we make this 
assumption primarily for ease of exposition. Admitting cor­
relations does not fundamentally change the nature of the 
algorithms to follow, though it does raise interesting mod­
eling and computational issues [3]. 
2.2 Computing Bids by Dynamic Programming 
The difficulty in computing bids for the sequential auctions 
A; lies in the fact that the agent does not have a specific val­uation for any individual good; rather, it has valuations over 
bundles. This suggests an agent should compute a bidding 
policy in which bids for specific resources are conditioned 
on the outcomes of previous auctions. In [3] we model this 
problem as a fully observable MDP [ 16, 2]. The computa­
tion of an optimal bidding policy can be implemented using 
a standard stochastic dynamic programming algorithm such 
as value iteration. We briefly recap this model below. 
As we will point out later in this section, optimal policy con­
struction may be computationally intensive. The main goal 
of this paper to examine specific approximations to ease this 
burden. However, this dynamic programming model deals 
with the complementarities and substitutability inherent in 
our resource model; no special devices are required. Fur­
thermore, it automatically deals with issues such as uncer­
tainty, dynamic valuation, "sunk costs," and so on. Finally, 
we stress that given stationary, uncorrelated bid distribu­
tions, the computed policy is optimal. 
We assume the decision problem is broken into n+ 1 stages, 
n stages at which bidding decisions must be made, and a 
terminal stage at the end of the round. We use a time index 
0 � t � n to refer to stages--time t refers to the point at 
which auction At+! for rt+1 is about to begin. The state of the decision problem for agent a at time t is given by 
two variables: h1 C R1, the subset of resources R1 held 
by agent a; and d1, the dollar amount (unspent endowment) 
available for future bidding. We write (h, d)1 to denote the 
state of a's decision problem at timet. 
The dynamics of the decision process can be characterized 
by a's estimated transition distributions. Assuming that 
prices are drawn independently from the stationary distribu­
tions Pr;, agent a can predict the effect of any action (bid) 
z available to it. If agent a is in state (h, d)1 at stage t, it can 
bid for rt+l any amount 0 � z � d1• Letting w denote the highest bid offered by other agents, if a bids z at timet, it 
will transition to state (h U {r
1
+1},d- z)t+1 with proba­
bilityPr1+1(w < z) and to(h,d)1+1 withPrt+1(w � z).6 
The final piece of the MDP is a reward function q. We 
simply associate a reward of zero with all states at stages 
0 through n - 1, and assign reward v(h) + f(d) to ev­
ery terminal state (h, d)". A bidding policy 1r is a map-
6For expository purposes, the model assumes ties are won. 
Several rules can be used for ties; none complicate the analysis. 
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ping from states into actions: for each legal state (h, d)1, 
1r( (h, d)1) = z means that a will bid z for resource rt+l· 
The value V" ( (h, d)1) of policy 1r at any state (h, d)1 is 
the expected reward E,..(q( (h, d)") l(h, d)1) obtained by ex­
ecuting 11". The expected value of 1r given the agent's initial 
state (0, e)l is simply V" ( (0, e)1). An optimal bidding pol­
icy is any 1r that has maximal expected reward at every state. 
We compute the optimal policy using value iteration [ 16], 
defining the value of states at stage t using the value of states 
at stage t + 1. Specifically, we set 
V((h,d)") = v(h) + f(d) 
and define, for each t < n: 
Pr1+1(w < z) · V((h U {rt}, d- z)1+1) 
+Pr1+1(w? z) · V((h, d)1+1) (!) 
maxQ( (h, d)1, z) (2) 
z�d 
be extended to allow for equilibrium computation. How­
ever, there are several reasons for using the approach de­
scribed above rather than a full Bayes-Nash equilibrium 
model [21]. First, equilibrium computation is often infea­
sible, especially in a nontrivial sequential, multi-resource 
setting like ours. Second, the information required on the 
part of each agent, nan1ely a distribution over the possible 
types of other agents, is incredibly complex--an agent type 
in this setting is its valuations for all resource bundles, mak­
ing the space of types unmanageable in general. 7 Finally, 
the common knowledge assumptions usually required for 
equilibrium analysis are unlikely to hold in this setting. Our 
model is thus more akin to limited rationality models (e.g., 
fictitious play [5, 9]), in particular, when agents attempt to 
learn bid distributions over time [3]. A consequence of this 
approach is that, in early rounds, allocations may not be effi­
cient. However, learning behavior tends to lead to efficient 
outcomes after some number of rounds, and often leads to 
optimal allocations (with respect to social welfare) [3]. V( (h, d)1) 
11"( (h, d)1) = argmaxQ((h,d)1,z) 
z�d 
(3) 3 Continuous Approximations of Bids and 
Endowments 
With V defined for all stage t + 1 states, Q ( ( h, d) 1 , z) de­
notes the value of bidding z at state (h, d)1 and acting op­
timally thereafter. V ( ( h, d?) denotes the optimal value at 
state ( h, d) 1, while 1r ( ( h, d) 1) is the optimal bid. 
Implementing value iteration requires that we enumerate, 
for each t, all possible stage t states and compute the con­
sequences of every feasible action at that state. This can re­
quire substantial computational effort. While linear in the 
state and action spaces (and in the number of stages n ), 
the state and action spaces themselves are potentially quite 
large. The number of possible states at stage t could poten­
tially consist of any subset of resources R1 together with 
any monetary component. The action set at a state with 
monetary component d has size d + 1. Fortunately, we can 
manage some of the complexity associated with various re­
source combinations by using certain pruning and general­
ization strategies; a number of these are described in [3]. 
Reducing the impact of the number of possible bids is more 
difficult. We can certainly restrict the state and action space 
to dollar values no greater than a's initial endowment e. If 
the PDF is well-behaved (e.g., concave), pruning is pos­
sible: for instance, once the expected value of a larger 
bids starts to decrease, search for a maximizing bid can be 
halted. Another method for dealing with this is to assume 
that endowment and bids are continuous. We turn our at­
tention to this strategy in the next section. 
We point out that the model described above does not al­
low for strategic reasoning on the part of the bidding agent. 
The agent takes the expected prices as given and does not 
attempt to compute any form of equilibrium. The motiva­
tion for this model is described in more detail in [3]: briefly, 
we assume there that the price models will be adjusted over 
time with the aim of converging to some form of equilib­
rium. We expect that the MDP model described here could 
When an agent's initial endowment is large or finely­
divisible, value iteration can be computationally expensive. 
For instance, given an endowment of$! 0,000 which can be 
bid in $1 increments, the state space of the MDP has size 
10,000 · 11il and the action space has size 10,000. An en­
dowment of $100 with penny increments is just as large. In 
order to deal with the computational complexity incurred by 
such endowments, we assume that endowments and bids are 
continuous-valued. This allows us to use continuous opti­
mization methods to compute optimal bids as a function of 
the state and represent our value functions in a continuous 
fashion. In Section 3.1 we describe the continuous MDP, 
while in Section 3.2 we present a fixed-grid, approximate 
representation for value functions, and show how to solve 
the MDP using this representation. 
3.1 Continuous Version of the MDP 
Viewing money as continuous requires that we make the 
following adjustments to the MDP described in Section 2. 
At any state where the agent's remaining endowment is d, 
the agent can consider bids in the interval [0, d); and given 
a maximum endowment m, state space ranges over any en­
dowment value in the interval [0, m] . Note that the state 
spaceS = 1i x [0, m] has both a discrete and continuous 
component. Since bids are now continuous, we assume the 
agent models the high bid distributions using a continuous 
density function. We generally assume that simple paranlet­
ric distributions or mixtures are used for this purpose (e.g., 
in Section 4, we use Gaussian bid distributions). 
Value functions in the discrete MDP presented in the 
last section are represented as a table of values. With 
7We use type here in the sense used in game theory for games 
with incomplete information (15]. 
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the hybrid MOP-containing both continuous and discrete ,,...----�-�--�--�--�---, 
components--we represent a value function V1 as a table 
of continuous functions. For each resource holding h � 
R1, we define the one-dimensional, continuous function 
Vt (d) == V1 ( ( h, d)); that is, Vt describes how V1 varies 
with remaining endowment for a fixed set of holdings h. 
In order to implement OP with the continuous dimension 
in the state space, we require some manageable represen­
tation for the continuous value function components Vt. 
At stage n (i.e., with zero stages to go), V,:' (d) is simply 
equal to q( (h, d)); since the reward function is specified in 
a suitable form, vhn will have a tractable form for each h � 
R. For instance, if our agent has linear utility for remain­
ing endowment-that is, if q((h, d)) == v(h) +ad-then 
vhn can be represented with two parameters. Constructing 
v: -1 requires that we backup values through possible bids 
(actions) as in Equation (I) and then choose the bid with 
highest Q-value to determine Vhn-1 as in Equation (2). 
For any specific state (h, d), the computation of v:-1 (d) 
is not problematic. Equation (2) requires that we find the 
bid z that maximizes Q((h, d)n-1, z) . As long as the re­
ward function is monotonically increasing with remaining 
endowment and the probability of winning a resource in­
creases with higher bids (and both are well-behaved), it 
is easy to see that the Q-function has a unique maximum. 
Thus the corresponding constrained maximization problem 
is easy to solve. The difficulty lies in the fact that we can­
not compute the value function at the infinitely many states 
(varying with possibly endowment). In general, the value 
function vhn-l will not have a convenient closed form, nor 
will vt for any t < n. 
To circumvent this difficulty, we adopt a grid-based ap­
proach to approximating the continuous (component) value 
functions at each stage. This method of approxima­
tion is fairly common in representing value functions in 
continuous-state MOPs. Continuous domains are studied 
quite frequently in reinforcement learning (RL ), and arise 
in the conversion of POMOPs to belief state MOPs. In 
fact, the grid-based approach to computing value functions 
for PO MOPs is a commonly used approximation technique 
[4, 11, 13, 12]. Unlike belief state MOPs (which have an 
n - !-dimensional state space, where n is the number of 
system states) or many multi-dimensional control and RL 
problems, our domain has only one continuous dimension. 
As such, we are not affected by the curse of dimensional­
ity that often plagues grid-based approximation methods in 
other areas: increasing the density of our grid causes only a 
linear increase in required computational effort. 
3.2 A Uniform Fixed Grid Approach 
Let us assume that we are given some representation of the 
continuous value function components Vt for each h � R1• 
Our grid-based approaches to computing an approximation 
of v�-1 all work as follows. First, a set of grid points is 
chosen: these form a small sample of the possible remain-
" 
Figure I: Uniform grid approximation: the solid line repre­
sents the true value function, the dashed line an approxima­
tion using a coarse grid, and the dotted line an approxima­
tion using a fine grid. 
ing endowments d at stage t - 1. These grid points are cho­
sen over the interval (0, m] (where m is the maximum initial 
endowment), and we assume that both 0 and m are among 
the set. Let there beg such points: 0 == d1 < d2 < · · · < dg == m. At each such point d;, we compute v;-1(d;) us­
ing �quation (2): �e �ote again that this is a fairlr �outine 
contmuous maxuruzatwn problem, and that Q1- ts con­
structed using the given functions V�. If each V� is correct, 
then we have computed the exact value function v;-1 at 
these grid points. We define v;-1 over the entire endow­
ment range using linear interpolation. For any endowment 
d, let di � d � di+1• We set 
The interpolation process is illustrated in Figure I for two 
different grid granularities. Note that v;-1 (d) is an approx­
imation to the true value v;-1 (d) in the hybrid MOP. 
Our uniform, fixed grid approach to value function compu­
tation assumes that a fixed grid is specified in advance, with 
g grid points uniformly covering the interval (0, m]. This 
grid is not adjusted during computation, nor does it vary 
across stages or across different states (with different hold­
ings h). Specifically, the steps above are repeated at each 
stage: V� ( d;) is computed at each grid point d; with re­
spect to the approximate value functions v�+1; and v� is 
defined at all remaining points by interpolation over the val­
ues V� ( d;) at the grid points. 
The grid-based approach allows one to determine a poste­
riori bounds in the error in the value function. Suppose that 
we are given an accurate t+ !-stage value function V1+1 (so 
that v;+1 (d) is correct for all hand all d). Because we com-
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Figure 2: Maximum error introduced by uniform grid ap­
proximation: the solid line represents the linear approxima­
tion; the dashed line is one possible, ill-behaved, true value 
function consistent with it. 
pute V� ( d;) exactly at each grid point d;, we are assured 
that the resulting approximate value function v� is correct 
at each of these grid points (for all h). Now consider the 
difference in value of = V�(di+l)- V�(d;) between any 
two consecutive grid points d; and d;+l· Since the value 
function is monotonically increasing with endowment (for 
any reasonable utility function), this difference is positive. 
Furthermore, the error in the approximate value function V� 
on the interval [ d; , di+ 1] must be bounded by this difference 
of. To see this, see the extreme value function candidate 
illustrated in Figure 2 between grid points d1 and d2• For 
any h � R1, define oh = max;<g of, and for any stage t 
define cf(V1) = maxhcR• cfh. This maximum value differ­
ence bounds the error in the estimated value function V1: 
Proposition 1 Let approximate value function V1 be gen­
erated (for all h � R1) with a .fixed grid approach, using 
the exact valuefunction vt+l. Then IIV1- V1ll < o(V1). 
Of course, we generally construct V1 using an approxima­
tion vt+l ofvt+l' thus the errors can accumulate; but they 
do so in an additive fashion. 
Proposition 2 If the continuous MDP for sequential auc­
tions (with n stages) is solved using a fixed grid approxi­
mation, then 
for all t :5 n. 
n 
IIVt- Vtll < 2: o(V;) 
i=t+l 
We note that these bounds, while tight theoretically, are 
generally not reached in practice, as we shall see in the next 
section. Error as large as this can only be reached for value 
functions that behave very badly. Finally, using standard ar­
guments regarding how error in value functions manifests 
itself in behavioral error, we note that the difference in value 
of the (greedy) policy induced by the approximate value 
function and the optimal policy is bounded by twice the er­
ror in the value function. 
4 Empirical Evaluation 
We have implemented the dynamic programming algorithm 
for sequential auctions in Matlab, and have experimented 
with the approximation of value functions using sampled, 
continuous functions. We performed 20 experiments each 
consisting of four runs. Each experiment comprises the 
computation of a bidding policy for an agent requiring four 
bundles of resources drawn from a set of ten potentially use­
ful resources. The number of resources per bundle was gen­
erated from a Gaussian distribution with mean 3 and vari­
ance I. The valuation for the bundles was also generated 
from a Gaussian with mean 15 and variance 2, while the es­
timated bid distributions were Gaussians with means in the 
range of3 to 6 for different resources and variance of 0.5. 
The utility function used is v(h) + 0.7d (so remaining en­
dowment is valued at 70 cents to the dollar).8 
The four runs in each experiment differ on the number of 
samples used in the approximation. One of the runs, which 
we identifyasDiscrete, consists of an initial endowment 
of $30,  with bids that can be incremented discretely in $ 1  
units. The dynamic program computing the bidding policy 
of the agent is based on the algorithm described in section 
2.2. Since there are no approximations involved, this run is 
our "gold standard" against which we compare the approx­
imations produced by the fixed grid methods. The optimal 
value function at the initial state in the Discrete model 
(i.e., expected value obtained in the sequence of auctions) 
tended to lie between 25 and 33 for the 20 different trials. 9 
The remaining three runs consist of the fixed grid strategy 
with continuous bids, using 5, 10, and 15 sample points, and 
are denoted as G5, GlO, and Gl5, respectively. 
We use several pruning techniques to reduce the number 
of states (i.e., different resource combinations considered 
at different stages). This influences both the computation 
time and the reporting of the errors. Since in a large number 
of these states the best policy is to bid zero (e.g., given the 
current resources it will be impossible to complete a bundle 
with the resource being auctioned), considering all of these 
states in error computation conveys misleading average er­
ror statistics (our approximations would look too good). By 
eliminating these states, we report on a more meaningful 
measure of error between the optimal result and our approx­
imations. In addition, we report relative error results rather 
than absolute error (scaling relative to the magnitude of the 
true value at each point). Errors reported are squared dif-
ferences using ( • � • ) 2, where e is the estimated value using 
8Discounting endowment is simply a convenient way to raise 
the relative values of all bundles uniformly. 
9This is higher than the expected value of not competing for 
resources, which has a value of21 (= 0.7 · 30). 
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Number of Mean Squared Mean Maximum Mean Squared Mean Maximum 
States Value Error Squared Value Error Policy Error Squared Policy Error 
Discrete 14415 0 0 0 0 
5 Grid 2790 0.2698 3.9008 0.2204 3.0842 
10 Grid 5115_ 0.1508 2 .4330 0.0650 0.9408 
15 Grid 7440 0.0169 0.2966 0.0367 0.5202 
Table 1: Aggregated results over all the states and all experiments . 
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Figure 3: Mean (left) and Maximum (right) Value Error Per Stage 
the approximation and v is the true value. If v < 1, we do 
not normalize. 
Table 1 provides the summary of the number of states ex­
plored by each method, the mean error in the value func­
tion, the mean error in the "optimal" policy induced by the 
corresponding value function, and the maximum error in the 
value function and induced policy. These are computed (av­
eraged or maximized) over all (unpruned) states in all stages 
of the dynamic program. The numbers reported are the av­
erages over the 20 experiments. 
As can be seen, we have a reduction in error (both in the 
value function and the induced policy) as we increase the 
number of sample points in the grid. Also there is an ex­
pected (linear) increase in computational effort as we in­
crease the number of sample points. These results strongly 
suggest that with a fraction of the computational effort ( 5 
grid points) we can obtain decent approximations to the 
value function and the optimal policy. Notice also that the 
error in induced behavior is generally smaller than the er­
ror in the approximate value function. This is because the 
incorrect value function still induces optimal bids at many 
states. The number of states explored by the approxima­
tions is a fraction of the the number required by the origi­
nal, accurate model, but the computation per stage is some­
times more. To display the average and maximum errors in 
the value function at different stages of the bidding process, 
we compute the average error over all (unpruned) states at 
each stage and over all 20 experiments. Figure 3 shows 
this stage-by-stage error (mean and maximum) in the val�e 
function, while Figure 4 shows the stage-by-stage error m 
the induced approximate policies. 
5 Variable Grid Approaches 
One difficulty with the fixed grid approach is that compu­
tational effort is sometimes spent computing values at grid 
points that do not improve the accuracy of the PWL approx­
imation of the value function, while candidate grid points 
that could reduce the error substantially are ignored. In 
the experiments described above, this was sometimes ob­
served to be the case. For this reason we consider several 
variable grid strategies which introduce grid points dynam­
ically based on some measure of the likely improvement 
they will make in the value function estimate. 
Method VG 1: Based on the error analysis above, one way 
to ensure that the maximum error is reduced as much as pos­
sible with as few grid points as possible is to introduce grid 
points in those intervals that have the largest maximum er­
ror. Variable grid method VGl does just this. We assume 
that we have a set of grid points d 1, · · · dn whose values 
V� ( d;) have been computed. (Initially, we assume that we 
have grid points at endowment level 0 and endowment level 
m, the maximum). For each consecutive pair of grid poin�s, 
the difference in value v� ( d; +I)-v� ( d;) computed. A grid 
point is introduced at the midpoint between that pair of grid 
points whose value difference is the largest. This contin­
ues until some maximum number of grid points has been 
introduced or the maximum value difference between any 
pair of adjacent grid points falls below some threshold. We 
know that the error in our approximation v� is bounded by 
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this maximum difference (as described in the previous sec­
tion). This adaptive grid method improves this error bound 
the fastest fashion possible. 
Figure 5 illustrates this method of introducing grid po�nts. 
Here the grid point d5 is introduced rather than d4 smce 
Vi(da)- Vi(d2) is larger than Vi(d2)- Vi(dl). Choos­
ing the maximum value difference can be implemented very 
quickly using a priority queue: the pair of adjacent grid 
points with the maximum value difference is popped off the 
queue, and the two new intervals created by the insertion of 
a new grid point are added to the queue using the value dif­
ference as a key. 
Method VG2: One difficulty with method VGI is that a lot 
of effort can be expended introducing grid points that have 
no real effect on the value function estimate. Specifically, if 
there is a segment of the value function that is actually lin­
ear, the introduction of a grid point in that region does not 
improve our estimate.1° For instance, adding a new point 
between d5 and d3 in the example above might improve the 
guaranteed error bound by the largest amount. But since 
_
it 
lies on a linear segment, it doesn't reduce the actual error m 
10 Because we often adopt a linear utility component for r�main­
ing endowment at the end of the round of aucttons (see Sectton 4), 
such linear segments arise rather frequently. 
the value function estimate at all. Introducing a point else­
where (e.g., at d4, or between d2 and ds) would be a more 
effective use of computational resources. 
To capture this intuition, we say that the error reduction of­
fered by the introduction of grid point ds is the absolute 
difference between Vi ( ds) (which we computed when that 
grid point was introduced) and the previous predicted value 
for d5 before the introduction of the point (that is, it's pre­
dicted value using the linear segment from d2 to da). If the 
introduction of d5 caused a small reduction in error, this 
suggests that introducing points on either side of it may �ot 
be useful in reducing error. Another method of measunng 
this is by exanlining the angles between the linear interpo­
lates. If the angle is close to 180°, then adding new points 
will not improve the accuracy significantly. The closer the 
angle is to goo, the greater the odds of improving the error 
by introducing new grid points. 
Our second variable grid method, VG2, requires the intro­
duction of pairs of grid points at each iteration. Suppose 
we have grid points d1, · · ·dn whose values Vi(d;) have been computed. Whenever a grid point is introduced, we 
compute its error reduction factor (ERF): the difference be­
tween its computed value and the value it was predicted to 
have just before it was introduced as a grid point. We keep 
une.xpanded grid points ordered in a priority queue, sorted 
according to their ERFs. When the grid point d; with the 
largest ERF is removed from the queue, it is considered 
expanded. Expanding a grid point d; requires that we in­
troduce two new grid points: one that bisects the interval 
[d;_1, d;]; and one that bisects the interval [d;, d;:+-d· Th�se 
two new grid points are added to our value functiOn �d m­
serted into the priority queue for subsequent expansiOn. 
This second method works extremely well when value 
functions have large linear segments. In Figure 6, we see 
that after the introduction of d4 and ds surrounding da, the 
error reduction factor of d4 is close to zero, since it lies on a 
linear segment between d3 and dz. The ERF fords is shown 
by the arrows, and is greater; so we introduce points d6 and 
d7 surrounding d5, ignoring further splitting of the interv�ls 
around d4. Notice that we can "fool" this method. If we m-
d5 d7 d8 d2 
Endowment 
d4 
Figure 6: Variable Grid Method VG2 
dl 
troduce a grid point d8 between d7 and d2 (in the middle of 
the "S-shaped" portion of the value function), we compute 
a �ery small ER! for ds; this is misleading since new grid 
pomts surroundmg d8 would be very useful. While poten­
tially problematic, such circumstances seem to arise rarely, 
at least in preliminary experimental evaluation. 
One could introduce a number of other variable grid gener­
ation techniques. While the two methods described above 
are intuitively appealing and easy to implement (and have 
low computational cost), others may be well-suited to dif­
ferent types of problems or different utility functions. We 
have not yet experimented with these techniques in depth. 
We note that the error bounds derived for the fixed grid 
method above apply directly to variable grid methods as 
well. Given a set of variable grid points, the error in the 
value function approximation can be bounded by the cS; fac­
tors (the maximum differences in values at consecutive grid 
points). 
6 Concluding Remarks 
6.1 Related Work 
Auctions involving complementary goods have been stud­
ied widely, though it is unknown whether simple selling 
mechanisms can lead to efficient outcomes [1, 22]. Two 
methods for dealing with complementarities have been 
studied in some depth in the literature: simultaneous auc­
tions for multiple goods [1, 18); and combinatorial auc­
tions in which agents submit bids for resource bundles [ 17, 
19, 22] .
. 
Neither of these models is suitable in the setting 
we constder, when resources are made available at different 
points in time or are offered by different sellers. 
Even in settings where the requirements of combinatorial 
or simultaneous auctions are met---<>r could be enforced--a 
sequential model has some attractive features. Unlike com­
binatorial models, it relieves the (computational) burden of 
d�te�n.
ing a final a.llocation from the seller, effectively dtstnbutmg computatiOn among the buyers (as in the simul­
t�eous case). This can be important, as determining an op­
timal allocation (maximizing the seller's revenue) is NP­
hard [ 19]. Our sequential model also has the advantage that 
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buyers are not required to reveal information about their 
valuations for specific resource bundles that they do not ob­
tain. Furthermore, it has greater flexibility in that agents 
can enter and leave the market without forcing recomputa­
tion of entire allocations. In contrast to simultaneous mod­
els, agents in the sequential model lessen their exposure. If 
an agent does not obtain a certain resource early in the se­
quence, it need not expose itself by bidding on complemen­
tary resources occurring later in the sequence. Agents are 
typically bidding in a state of greater knowledge in the se­
quential model, at least during later auctions. 
While bidding strategies for sequential auctions would 
seem to be an issue worthy of study, there appears to have 
been little research focused on this issue. What work ex­
ists (see, e. g., [8, 10)) tends to focus the seller's point of 
view-for example, will simultaneous or sequential sales 
maximize revenue--and does not address the types of com­
plementarities and substitutability we consider here. 
6.2 Summary and Future Directions 
In this paper we reviewed a model for computing optimal 
sequential bidding policies for resources that exhibit com­
plementarities and substitutability, and described a contin­
uous approximation of the model. We presented several 
grid-based approximate representations for value functions, 
and described a dynamic programming algorithm that uses 
these PWL representations. While the resulting policies 
may not be optimal, we provided error bounds on the value 
functions and policies produced, and showed empirically 
that the fixed-grid method works quite well: it produces 
high quality value functions and policies with a small por­
tion of the computational effort required by an exact algo­
rithm. We also illustrated the "contract anytime" flavor of 
these algorithms: with denser grids (thus, more computa­
tional effort) one can produce higher quality policies. 
We have not yet experimented with the variable grid ap­
proaches in detail. We expect these algorithms to outper­
form the fixed grid algorithm, especially in domains where 
linear utility for remaining endowment is adopted--this is 
due to the frequent linear segments exhibited by certain 
parts of the value function. It is also the case the general 
strategy of adopting PWL approximations is especially ap­
propriate when these linear utility fragments abound. We 
hope to explore other approximate representations that are 
suitable for other "typical" utility functions. 
There are a number of other issues we hope to explore in the 
near future. One is the appropriate modeling of correlations 
in prices. As mentioned above, when goods exhibit comple­
mentarities, it is highly unlikely that prices will be uncorre­
lated. Modeling this simply requires that the agent maintain 
a joint distribution reflecting price expectations.11 The dif­
ficulty lies in strategy computation-when one price is ob­
se�ed, expected prices for future resources may change, re­
qumng a change in "planned" behavior. In other words, the 
11 Clearly, representations that exploit a certain amount of inde­
pendence can be used as well. 
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decision problem is truly partially observable and requires 
some form of history-dependent policy [3]. 
Another avenue we hope to explore is the integration of the 
adaptive model explored in [3}--where prices are learned 
during multiple rounds of auctions-with the continuous 
approximation strategy used here. Note that to include 
adaptivity in the continuous model described in Section 3 
requires only the update of the bid distributions, which for 
simple parametric forms and mixture models (e.g., Gaus­
sians) is a well-known process [7]. 
Finally, we want to explore the deeper issues involved with 
integrating an agent's "object-level" sequential reasoning 
(i.e., the decision making in which the courses of action 
that consume resources are developed) with the type of mar­
ket reasoning described here. Specifically, we envision the 
emergence of very interesting policy patterns; for example, 
an agent might decide not to bid for resources until it exe­
cutes part of its plan because the uncertainty associated with 
that plan's outcome may make obtaining the resource too 
risky until it is more certain of the plan's outcome. A "com­
pound MOP" modeling all levels of reasoning seems to be 
an appropriate framework for thinking about such prob­
lems. 
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